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TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION IN FLORIDA:
A LOOK AT HOUSE BILL 1531
MARC W. DULNBAR
The Information Age requires a new regulatory policy that
recognizes technological reality, and rejects the exclusion of
otherwise qualified providers from any technology.'
O VER the last twenty years, the telecommunications industry in
the United States has undergone a dramatic evolution, which is
the result, in part, of numerous judicial and regulatory decisions that
have transformed America's telecommunications marketplace. 2 These
decisions have opened the door to aggressive competition in some ar-
eas of the telecommunications industry, which, coupled with numer-
ous technological advancements, has plunged the world into the
"Information Age."
1. John P. Fons, The Local Exchange Network in the Information Age - The Need for
New Policy, 125 PuB. UTI. FORT. 20 (1990). Mr. Fons is currently an attorney and lobbyist with
the law firm of Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers and Proctor, which represents local
exchange telephone companies such as ALLTEL and CENTEL in Florida.
2. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
569 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1983); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C.
1983), aff'd sub nom. California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983); United States v. West-
ern Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal dismissed, 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd in part, 900 F.2d 283
(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 911 (1990); United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir 1993); First Computer Inquiry, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) (Computer I
Tentative Decision); First Computer Inquiry, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) (Computer I Final Deci-
sion), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973);
Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (Computer II Final Decision); Second Com-
puter Inquiry, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980) (Computer II Reconsidered Decision); Second Computer
Inquiry, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981) (Computer II Further Reconsidered Decision), aff'd sub noma.
Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 938 (1983); Third Computer Inquiry, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (Phase I Order); Third
Computer Inquiry, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987) (Phase I Reconsideration); Third Computer Inquiry,
2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987) (Phase 11 Order); Third Computer Inquiry, 3 F.C.C.R. 1135 (1988)
(Phase I Further Reconsideration); Third Computer Inquiry, 3 F.C.C.R. 1150 (1988) (Phase II
Reconsideration), vacated and remanded sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir.
1990); Third Computer Inquiry, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571 (1991) (Computer III Remand Proceeding),
petition for review pending, California v. FCC, No. 92-70105 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 21, 1992).
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While the arrival of this era in telecommunications history has been
widely publicized, the true magnitude of the technology and its impact
on the transmission of information within the United States has
scarcely been realized. The emergence of cellular telephones, fax ma-
chines, and electronic mail ("E-mail") only scratches the surface of
the advancements to come.3 The reasons for the lag in the actual user
realization of this glorious "Information Age" span volumes of pub-
lished material.4 Crucial questions must still be addressed by policy-
makers at both the federal and state levels concerning how the
technology will be implemented, who will implement it, how imple-
mentation will be financed, what role competition will have on imple-
mentation, and finally, how the technology will be regulated.
This Comment examines Florida's approach to these questions and
the advancements of the "Information Age." This Comment focuses
3. Currently, telecommunications providers are scrambling to perfect interactive telecom-
munications networks that offer customers an unimaginable array of services. Time Warner Ca-
ble is leading the way and will reportedly unveil a Full Service Network that will allow its
customers to select from hundreds of cable channels offering interactive educational programs,
video games, movies on demand, and even picture telephones. Business Digest, ST. PETERsauo
Tud~s, Jan. 27, 1993, at 1E. The network is anticipated to be on-line to 4000 residents in the
Orlando area by mid-1994. Id. The network combines the expertise of computer and telecom-
munications companies such as AT&T, US West, IBM, and Microsoft and is expected to serve as
many as 55,000 Orlando residents by 1996. Jay Hamburg, Cities Tuning in to TV of Future,
OE .ANDO SENTINEL, May 30, 1993, at Al. The Full Service Network is a combination of several
experimental projects presently on-line throughout North America. Some examples of such in-
teractive applications are as follows:
Montreal: sports fans can watch the Expos and Canadians on a special two-way cable-
television channel that lets them choose camera angles or call up player statistics with
a click of their remote controls.
San Diego: cable customers can write checks electronically and make travel reserva-
tions through their TV sets.
Birmingham, Michigan: fourth graders can participate in classes and school programs
from their homes via their cable television system.
Georgia: doctors can consult about a patient's X-rays across the state via a medical
imaging network.
Id. These advancements offer a glimpse into the twenty-first century. If regulations continue to
relax, experts estimate that by the year 2000, 10 million homes will be connected to interactive
telecommunications networks. Id.
4. See generally Alexander C. Larson & Douglas R. Mudd, Collocation and Telecommuni-
cations Policy: A Fostering of Competition on the Merits?, 28 CAL. W. L. REv. 263 (1992);
Andrew C. Barrett, The Telecommunications Infrastructure of the Future, 23 U. TOL. L. REV.
85 (1991); Jane A. Strachan, Untangling the Regulatory and Legal Wires to Telephone and Ca-
ble Television Technology, 11 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 599 (1991); Eric T. Werner, Something's
Gotta Give: Antitrust Consequences of Telephone Companies' Entry into Cable Television, 43
FED. CoMM. L.J. 215 (1991); Warren G. Lavey, Universal Telecommunications Infrastructure
for Information Services, 42 FED. COMm. L.J. 151 (1990); Craig D. Dingwall, Imputation of
Access Charges - A Prerequisite for Effective IntraLA TA Toll Competition, 40 Armr. L. Rav.
433 (1988); Gail G. Schwartz & Jeffery H. Hoagg, Virtual Divestiture: Structural Reform of an
RHC, 44 FED. CoMm. L.I. 285 (1992).
19931 TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION
primarily on what the Florida Legislature and the Florida Public Serv-
ice Commission have done to prepare the state for the technology of
the twenty-first century. In addition, this Comment addresses whether
these efforts meet the growing needs of the state and whether they
accommodate the nationwide trend toward deregulation and increased
competition in the intrastate telecommunications marketplace.'
I. HISTORICAL AND REGULATORY BACKGROUND
Before embarking on an analysis of Florida's efforts, a brief histor-
ical review of telecommunications regulation is necessary to under-
stand the emergence of the "Information Age" and the debate
surrounding future telecommunications services.
The current communications era began with the creation of the tele-
graph and telephone. Since then, competition over the transmission of
information has led to an innumerable amount of technological ad-
vancements. Today, information may be passed along twisted pairs of
copper wire 6 or along coaxial cable. 7 This same information may also
5. Regulators at both the federal and state levels see the current market restrictions as
impeding economic efficiency and innovation in the telecommunications marketplace. See gener-
ally Barrett, supra note 4; Schwartz & Hoagg, supra note 4. In calling for relaxations in these
market restrictions, the FCC stated that competition has brought telecommunications consumers
"increased service options, reduced rates, and faster implementation of new technologies." In re
Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Company Facilities, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369, 7378
(1992).
6. Most telephone lines running into homes and businesses in the United States consist of
two twisted copper wires known as the "twisted pair." Kevin Maney, Cable, Phone Firms
Wrangle over Future, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 1993, at lB. The twisted copper pair uses one wire
to transmit and the other wire to receive information. Id. A voice generally sounds different over
these wires because they cannot carry all of the information which makes up that person's voice.
Id. Due to the limited information that can travel across these wires, phone lines can only carry
voice and data absent the use of any expensive compression technology. George Gilder, Cable's
Secret Weapon, FoREas, Apr. 13, 1992, at 80, 81. The next generation of communications, how-
ever, may consist of an information exchange that can handle a myriad of information over and
above a simple conversation. Id. This volume of information transfer is virtually impossible
along the twisted copper pair. See Maney, supra, at lB.
7. Coaxial cable, also known as "broadband pipe," is the thick white cable commonly
used to connect television sets with cable television converter boxes. See Gilder, supra note 6, at
81. Over short distances, coaxial cable can carry as much information as fiber-optic cable. See
infra note 8; see also Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Take a Trip into the Future on the Electronic Super-
highway, Tnar, Apr. 12, 1993, at 50, 54. Current cable systems have a bandwidth of one billion
hertz (one gigahertz), whereas the twisted copper pair has a bandwidth of only four thousand
hertz (four kilohertz). Gilder, supra note 6, at 81. The entire Library of Congress could be
passed across coaxial cable in only eight hours. Id. Over the telephone company's "twisted cop-
per pair," this same information transfer would take over 500 years! Id. While twisted copper
pair can only carry voice and data, coaxial cable can carry full motion video, high resolution
medical images, vivid educational simulations, and many other combinations of two-way voice,
data, and video transfer. Id. For this reason, most new telecommunications systems utilize fiber-
optic or coaxial cable to take advantage of this increased information capacity.
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run through highways of light inside fiber-optic cables8 or be beamed
from satellite to satellite. 9 In addition, cellular, microwave, and radio
technology enable transmission without the hindrances of cumber-
some satellite dishes or "land-line" attachments.
With the increased interdependence between computer technology
and the transfer of information, the spoken word is no longer the only
form of communication that travels over this myriad of transmission
equipment. 0 Today, data transfer of documents and computer images
is commonplace. With the emergence of fiber-optic technology and
high-speed digital switching, data, voice, and video information may
travel through the same mediums." Computers can now communicate
with like or unlike computers, and users may choose any number of
ways to communicate by combining video, voice, and data transfer."
Regulation of this transfer of information today depends upon the
medium used and the location of the end user. Before 1983, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC) and state utility regulatory
commissions divided the regulation of telephony according to local or
long-distance phone calls.13 Today, however, regulation also depends
upon who is transmitting the information, since federally regulated
entities-including cable television, cellular, microwave, and radio
transmission providers-may carry information to both interstate and
intrastate users.' 4
A. A T& T & Information Services
With the divestiture of AT&T in 1984, the regulatory scheme for
telecommunications services was further complicated."' On January 1,
8. Fiber-optic cable is made up of hairlike strands of glass. Elmer-Dewitt, supra note 7, at
53-54. These strands of glass are said to be so pure that it would be possible to see through a
window of them that is 70 miles thick! Id. This purity makes fiber-optic cable the most ideal
carrier of information ever invented, A single strand of fiber-optic cable can handle 250,000
times more information than the standard telephone company's "twisted copper pair." Id. This
unbelievable volume could carry the nation's entire radio and telephone traffic and still have
room for more information. Id. Nevertheless, current uses take advantage of less than one per-
cent of its theoretical capacity. Id.
9. ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAK-UP 75 (1991).
10. Id.
1I. Mike Langherg & Rory J. O'Conner, The Digital Revolution, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT,
Nov. 1, 1992, at lB.
12. CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 5. Voice service is generally thought of as the normal tele-
phone service used everyday. Werner, supra note 4, at 230-31. Video service is largely used as a
source of entertainment and information. Id. at 230. Data transfer, on the other hand, is pri-
marily used by business consumers for high-speed transmission of computer manipulated infor-
mation. Id. Experts predict the demand for these types of services will increase as video
conferencing and high-speed document transfer become more popular. Id. at 230-31 n.65.
13. See CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 18.
14. See FLA. STAT. § 364.02(7) (1991); 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559 (1988) (cable television); 47
C.F.R. § 22 (1991) (cellular).
15. Before the divestiture, AT&T and its Bell operating companies served approximately
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1984, AT&T divested itself of its twenty-two local exchange telephone
companies' 6-the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs)-as part of set-
tlement of a 1974 antitrust suit between AT&T and the Department of
Justice."7 The United States District Court for Washington, D.C.
modified this settlement agreement, hereinafter referred to as the
modified final judgment (MFJ).' 8 Judge Harold Greene, who presided
over this matter, retained jurisdiction to approve the implementation
of the MFJ, to enforce its terms, and to further modify the judgment
as necessary depending upon the competitive climate of the telecom-
munications industry.1 9
Under the MFJ, AT&T retained its long-distance telephone opera-
tions, its customer-premises equipment20 manufacturing business, and
eighty percent of the nation's telephone subscribers. CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 8. Furthermore,
AT&T controlled virtually all of the long distance market. Id. Through this dominance, AT&T
and its subsidiaries were able to control the entire telecommunications marketplace in the United
States. For a more in depth discussion of AT&T's dominance of the American telephony which
led to the MFJ, see id. at 16-42.
16. As defined in the MFJ, an "exchange" is a geographic area established by a BOC in
accordance with the following criteria:
1) any such area shall encompass one or more contiguous local exchange areas serving
common social, economic, and other purposes, even where such configuration tran-
scends municipal or other local governmental boundaries;
2) every point served by a BOC within a State shall be included within an exchange
area;
3) no such area which includes part or all of one standard metropolitan statistical area
. . . shall include a substantial part of any other standard metropolitan statistical area
• . .unless the court shall otherwise allow; and
4) except with approval of the Court, no exchange area located in one State shall
include any point located within another State.
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 229 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Telephone exchange service is defined as:
service within a telephone exchange, or within a connected system of telephone ex-
changes within the same exchange area operated to furnish to subscribers inter-com-
municating service of the character ordinarily furnished by a single exchange, and
which is covered by the exchange service charge.
47 U.S.C. § 153(r) (1988). fn less complicated terms, exchange service is generally thought of as
the service provided by the local telephone company; for example, local telephone service. Be-
cause local telephone companies possess essentially the only link to consumers' telephones, it has
been said that BOCs have "an unchallenged, rate-regulated monopoly to provide [their] serv-
ice[s]." Werner, supra note 4, at 216.
17. See generally United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 131; see also
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 990 (D.D.C. 1983); United States v. Western
Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub noma. California v. United States, 464 U.S.
1013 (1983).
18. See American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 226.
19. Id. at 231.
20. Customer premises equipment (CPE) means equipment employed on the premises of a
person (other than a carrier) to originate, route, or terminate telecommunications, but does not
include equipment used to multiplex, maintain, or terminate access lines. Id. CPE includes all
terminal equipment kept on subscriber premises, ranging from ordinary telephones to computer-
ized switchboards. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1225 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990).
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its research and development facility, known as Bell Laboratories. 2
AT&T, now divested of the BOCs, was free to enter virtually all other
facets of the marketplace, including data processing. 22 Under the
watchful eyes of Judge Greene, the United States Justice Department,
and the FCC, AT&T now operates in a virtually deregulated competi-
tive environment.
The divested BOCs, on the other hand, were generally restricted by
the MFJ to providing local exchange telephone service and other
"natural monopoly service[s] actually regulated by tariff. ' 2 Under
the MFJ, the BOCs could not provide "interexchange telecommunica-
tions services, ' 24 offer "information services," or engage in the man-
ufacture of telecommunications equipment .25 These restrictions
ensured that the BOCs did not use their monopoly over local tele-
phone facilities, as AT&T did, to gain a competitive advantage over
other telecommunications providers.26
The MFJ defined an "information service" as:
the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing,
transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available
information which may be conveyed via telecommunications, except
that such service does not include any use of any such capability for
the management, control, or operation of a telecommunications
system or the management of a telecommunications service. 27
For all practical purposes, information services are generally unregu-
lated services where competition among telecommunications providers
thrives .2  Information services differ from what has become known as
21. Id. at 1226.
22. Id.
23. See American TeL & Tel. Co., 552 F.Supp. at 227-28.
24. An interexchange telecommunications service is a telecommunications service between a
point or points located in one exchange telecommunications area and a point or points located in
one or more other exchange areas or a point outside the originating exchange area. Id. Basically,
interexchange telephone service is thought of as traditional long distance service. This Comment
will focus on intraexchange telecommunications service and the services offered by the BOCs
and other local exchange carriers (LECs). While interexchange carriers are active participants in
the advancements of the telecommunications industry, this limitation keeps this Comment within
the confines of the State of Florida and the jurisdiction of Florida's Legislature and the Florida
Public Service Commission.
25. Id. at 227.
26. Id. at 231; see also Strachan, supra note 4, at 602 n.l 1.
27. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 229.
28. For a scholarly discussion of the current competitive climate of the national informa-
tion services market, see generally Lavey, supra note 4. For an example of active competition
within the State of Florida, see generally In re Request for approval of filing to introduce Nil
service by Bellsouth Telecommunications, Inc., Docket Nos. 910049-TL, 920913-TL, & 920962-
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"plain old telephone service" (POTS), which is basic telephone serv-
ice provided by local exchange carriers as regulated common carriers
to monopoly ratepayers. 29
The MFJ's broad information services prohibition on the BOCs has
gradually receded over the last ten years. After its first review of the
prohibition, the district court relaxed the restrictions and allowed the
BOCs to transmit these types of services generated by other independ-
ent entities.30 A year later, the court clarified that BOCs may provide
gateway circuits for videotext systems3" and voice storage services.
3 2
Finally, in 1993, the district court lifted the ban altogether so that
BOCs may now fully carry and offer consumers all types of informa-
tion services." With new forms of information services and new mar-
kets for the services developing daily, competition between the
suppliers of information services has greatly increased.
B. FCC Computer Inquiries: Enhanced Services
The issue of which telecommunications services a Local Exchange
Carrier (LEC) may provide in an unregulated market is further com-
plicated by the FCC's classification and interpretation of unregulated
services. In the early 1970s, prior to the MFJ and its "information
services" definition, the debate over which services should be regu-
lated began with the emergence of computer technology and the trans-
mission of computer signals across telephone lines.34 The transmission
of computer signals sparked a series of FCC inquiries as to how these
services should be regulated.35 These inquiries, which are known as the
TL (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n.). These dockets are currently pending before the Florida Public
Service Commission. They involve a debate between at least 10 potential providers of informa-
tion service that would like to provide information, such as the latest news, via the telephone
lines. While this is currently being provided in most local exchanges using seven digit calling
numbers, these providers would like to use abbreviated numbers, such as 511, to provide their
services to consumers.
29. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1223 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990).
30. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987).
31. Videotext services allow consumers to engage in transactions or information searches
through personal computers or video terminals connected to phone lines. CRANDAUL, Supra note
9, at 5. Westlaw and Lexis are forms of videotext services.
32. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 1, 22 (D.D.C. 1988).
33. MFJ Modification Order, 993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
34. See generally First Computer Inquiry, 28 F.C.C.2d 291 (1970) (Computer I Tentative
Decision).
35. See generally First Computer Inquiry, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) (Computer I Final Deci-
sion), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.
1973); Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384 (1980) (Computer II Final Decision); Second
Computer Inquiry, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980) (Computer II Reconsidered Decision); Second Com-
puter Inquiry, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981) (Computer II Further Reconsidered Decision), aff'd sub
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First Computer Inquiry, Second Computer Inquiry, and Third Com-
puter Inquiry, continue today on the heels of the Ninth Circuit's re-
mand of the FCC's most recent rulemaking for further consideration
of this issue."
At the heart of these deliberations has been the FCC's classification
of telecommunications services as either "enhanced" or "basic" for
the purpose of regulation." While the debate continues before the
FCC, the distinction between these terms is generally analogous to the
distinction between POTS and information services. 8 Basic services
are generally provided by a common carrier to its monopoly ratepay-
ers as a fundamental part of their basic telephone service. 9 These
services are limited to the offering of transmission capacity for the
movement of information and are said to comprise a "virtually trans-
parent" communications path in terms of their interaction with cus-
tomer-supplied information.4
In contrast, enhanced services are those additional telecommunica-
tions services that are not necessary parts of basic telephone service. 4l
The FCC's interim definition of "enhanced service," adopted pending
the conclusion of the Third Computer Inquiry proceedings, is found
at Section 64.702(a) of the FCC rules and includes services "offered
over common carrier transmission facilities used in interstate commu-
nications, which employ computer processing applications that act on
the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscri-
ber's transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, dif-
ferent, or restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction
nom. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983); Third Computer Inquiry, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (Phase I Order);
Third Computer Inquiry, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987) (Phase I Reconsideration); Third Computer
Inquiry, 2 F.C.C.R. 3072 (1987) (Phase II Order); Third Computer Inquiry, 3 F.C.C.R. 1135
(1988) (Phase I Further Reconsideration); Third Computer Inquiry, 3 F.C.C.R. Rcd 1150 (1988)
(Phase II Reconsideration), vacated and remanded sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217
(9th Cir. 1990); Third Computer Inquiry, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571 (1991) (Computer III Remand Pro-
ceeding), petition for review pending, California v. FCC, No. 92-70105 (9th Cir. filed Feb. 21,
1992).
36. See California, 905 F.2d at 1246; see also Third Computer Inquiry, 6 F.C.C.R. at 7571.
37. See California, 905 F.2d at 1223-24.
38. See generally id.
39. See Third Computer Inquiry, 104 F.C.C.2d at 968.
40. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 420 (Computer II Final Decision). The
FCC inquiries point out that basic telephone service is not as "basic" as the name suggests. Id.
at 419-20. Basic service was once classified as mere two-way voice communication via a tele-
phone, substantively the definition of POTS. Id. at 418. With the emergence of computers, fax
machines, and other sophisticated forms of customer premises equipment, the FCC noted that
basic service may include more than the mere transmission of voice between two parties. Id. at
419.
41. Third Computer Inquiry, 104 F.C.C.2d at 968.
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with stored information." 42 Due to the substantial consumer benefits
stemming from competition in the enhanced services market, ' 3 all
services falling under this definition may be provided by any and all
telecommunications providers in an unregulated, competitive environ-
ment."4
The distinction between POTS and information services, or basic
and enhanced services,'  is important because these terms draw the
lines between "competitive" services and "monopoly" services. This
debate, which has yet to be resolved by Judge Greene and the FCC,
has also spilled over into the halls of the Florida Legislature and the
hearing rooms of the Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC).4 6
The outcome of these debates will determine how the services will be
defined, who may engage in providing these services, and what regula-
tions, if any, will govern their providers.
The MFJ and the FCC decisions resulted in the regulation of the
transmission of telecommunications services within Florida by either
the Federal District Court of Washington, D.C., the FCC, or the
FPSC, depending on the provider. 47 Furthermore, the types of services
that may be provided within this state and the regulation of these serv-
ices, if any, depend upon the definition of the terms "monopoly,"
"enhanced," and "competitive" services."'
42. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (1991). This definition overlaps the MFJ's "information serv-
ices" definition. See California v. FCC, 905 F.2d at 1226 n.13. Enhanced services are generally
database services such as Westlaw and Lexis. Id. at 1223 n.3.
43. The FCC has stated that the present structure of regulated basic service and unregulated
enhanced service is advancing the public interest by "promoting regulatory certainty and by
comporting with the actual development of the enhanced services industry." Third Computer
Inquiry, 104 F.C.C.2d at 968.
44. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 420.
45. Presently, Florida has not adopted a definition for any of these terms. See discussion
infra parts III, IV.
46. See generally Fla. HB 1531 (1993); In re Investigation into which local exchange com-
pany services are effectively competitive in 1993, No. 930046-TP (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
opened Apr. 2, 1993).
47. Three federal agencies regulate telecommunications, including the FCC, which regulates
commercial airwaves and interstate common carrier services, the National Telecommunications
and Information Administration, which regulates the government's radio spectrum, and the De-
partment of Justice, which enforces the antitrust laws and oversees the AT&T consent decrees.
See Barrett, supra note 4, at 92-93 n.22. Furthermore, as the "Information Age" progresses,
FCC Commissioner Barrett sees local municipal governments emerging as regulators responsible
for franchising cable television systems. Id.
48. The Florida Legislature has defined "monopoly service" as "a telecommunications
service for which there is no effective competition, either in fact or by operation of law." FLA.
STAT. 6 364.02(2) (1991). Presently, neither the Florida Legislature nor the Florida Public Service
Commission has provided any universal definition for the term "effectively competitive." See
discussion infra part IV. These two bodies have also failed to define the terms "enhanced serv-
ice" and "competitive service" to govern the regulation on intrastate telecommunications. Id.
1993]
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II. AN INDUSTRY OUTLOOK
Immediately after the issuance of the MFJ, the LECs offered the
sole link for all consumers' telecommunications services.4 9 Anyone, in-
cluding long-distance carriers, wishing to provide any form of service
first had to interconnect with the LECs, which offered the only net-
work to consumers' phone lines.5 0 In addition to their exclusive tie-in
with consumers, the LECs also owned the only high-volume switching
systems that allowed for routing of all forms of telecommunications.,,
The local network controlled by the LECs became known as the local
access "bottleneck," as all other telecommunications providers were
forced to interconnect with this network to supply services to their
prospective consumers. 2 As technology advances, new telecommuni-
cations providers are slowly eroding the LEC stronghold over local
access."
Some believe that the access charges imposed by the LECs upon
other providers using and interconnecting with the "bottleneck" are
one of the chief reasons for the low cost of local telephone service. 4
Many proponents of continued LEC domination of local telecommun-
ications services and advocates of the protection of "universal
service '' agree that these access charges ensure that basic telecom-
munications service will be available and affordable to all subscri-
bers. 6 These advocates further assert, however, that the current
While Florida has avoided adopting such definitions, other governing and regulatory bodies
throughout the nation have clearly delineated these terms. See generally supra text accompanying
note 42 (defining "enhanced service"); 47 U.S.C. § 543 (defining "effective competition")
(amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992); MINN.
STAT. § 237.57(2) (1992) (defining "competitive telecommunications service"); ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 220, para. 5/13-209 (1992) (defining "competitive telecommunications service").
49. See California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 1990). Today, the local telephone
company industry is comprised of roughly 1300 companies that reach almost every U.S. home
and garner more than 90 billion a year in revenue. Peter Coy, The Baby Bells Learn a Nasty
New Word: Competition, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 25, 1991, at 96. It is estimated that LECs control
9907o of the local telephone market. Id. at 97.
50. Coy, supra note 49, at 97.
51. See CRjaqALL, supra note 9, at 11-12; Strachan, supra note 4, at 610-11.
52. See California, 905 F.2d at 1224 n.5.
53. See generally Schwartz & Hoagg, supra note 4.
54. See Coy, supra note 49, at 96.
55. Universal service is the term used to denote the concept that a utility is required to
supply all reasonable demands for service by those who can pay for it. Donald L. Bell, Unbun-
dling: An Alternative to the Current System of Cable Television Franchising, 21 CuMB. L. REv.
43, 51-52 (1984). The ability to provide affordable and easily accessible basic telecommunica-
tions service is the ultimate goal of regulators at both the federal and state levels. See Valerie
Hersch, What 1Happens to Grandma Millie?, FLA. TREND, Feb. 1992, at 34, 36. See generally
Barrett, supra note 4.
56. Larson& Mudd, supra note 4, at 267 n.15.; Schwartz& Hoagg, supra note 4, at 289.
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competitive trend in the local telecommunications markets will lead to
a decline in the overall ubiquity of telecommunications. 57 However,
this predicted decline has not materialized in Florida as universal serv-
ice has continually strengthened over the past several years."S
A. Competitive Access Providers
The LECs no longer exercise the exclusive link to consumers in to-
day's telecommunications industry. With the emergence of fiber-optic
and cellular technology, many providers have now equipped them-
selves with the technology to provide "bypass services," which allow
consumers to circumvent the local access "bottleneck" controlled by
the LECs.59 "Competitive access providers" (CAPs), such as Interme-
dia, Inc., Time Warner AxS, Alternet, and Teleport, Inc., use fiber-
optic cable systems to bypass local networks and reroute long distance
calls directly from end users to their long-distance providers, thereby
avoiding the costly access charges of the local network.60
In addition to providing bypass service to long distance carriers,
these same competitive providers are wiring entire metropolitan areas
and enabling customers to bypass the local networks for local calls to
other telecommunications consumers on the "loop." 6 This practice is
known as creating a "downtown loop" or "metropolitan access net-
work. "62 These fiber-optic networks offer all aspects of LEC basic or
POTS service and are currently on-line in many major metropolitan
areas, such as New York City.63
These competitive networks currently offer many freedoms that are
not available with the existing LEC networks. For example, CAPs can
57. Larson & Mudd, supra note 4, at 267-68.
58. By the end of 1990, 93% of Florida residents had access to telecommunications service,
an increase of 4.3% since 1984. Hersch, supra note 55, at 36.
59. Larson & Mudd, supra note 4, at 274. By using fiber-optic cables and digital switching,
CAPs employ more sophisticated networks than the LECs. While LECs use these superior tech-
nologies in their central offices, more often than not the last mile of cable to the customer
consists of the "twisted copper pair," which severely limits the network's capacity. Hersch, su-
pra note 55, at 35.
60. See Larson & Mudd, supra note 4, at 274.
61. See Schwartz & Hoagg, supra note 4, at 288; CLANroDAL, supra note 9, at 52. At the end
of 1991, 23 CAPs reported investing $82.6 million in their networks and deploying 2,071 route
miles of fiber to 5,891 customer locations. In re Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone
Company Facilities, 7 F.C.C.IR. 7369, 7373 n.5 (1992).
62. In re Expanded Interconnection, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7373 n.5.
63. See Coy, supra note 49, at 97. CAPs report operating in various cities of vatious sizes
throughout the country, including Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Houston, Indiana-
polis, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, San Francisco,
Seattle, and Washington, D.C., as well as Princeton, Cambridge, Orlando, Tampa, Portland,
Rochester, Kansas City, Birmingham, Tulsa, Des Moines, and Grand Rapids. In re Expanded
Inteconnection, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7373 n.5.
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negotiate contracts that offer unique terms, conditions, and prices de-
pending on the needs and desires of their customers. 4 As most CAPs
are not subject to the same regulatory restraint of LEC pricing, they
can respond quickly and precisely to a customer's immediate needs
and demands65 and offer prices that are ten to twenty percent below
competing LEC tariff rates.66
Some opponents of CAP networks assert that the "downtown
loops" are a superfluous network of local telecommunications distri-
bution and a "threat" to universal basic service. 67 While these net-
works may, in fact, be duplicative of LEC networks, their existence
offers security to consumers that have lost millions of dollars in busi-
ness during accidental shut-downs of LEC networks. 68 Furthermore,
these "unnecessary" networks permit increased volume and speed for
64. Larson & Mudd, supra note 4, at 274-75.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 275.
67. See generally Larson & Mudd, supra note 4. Critics of CAP networks assert that cur-
rent regulations allow for "creamskimmer" entry into the local telecommunications mar-
kets. Id. at 268, 287-91. A creamskimmer is an economically inefficient market participant that
can only enter a market and survive if regulation forces an incumbent market supplier to charge
prices that are higher than those permitted by other participants. Id. at 286 n.16. While LECs
are required by their tariffs to charge prices at certain levels, the FCC has, on numerous occa-
sions, rejected the creamskimmer application to the competition in telecommunications markets.
See, e.g., In re Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Applications to
Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave
Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, and 61 of the Commission's Rules, 24
F.C.C.2d 318, 332-34 (1970) (Notice of Inquiry to Formulate Policy, Notice of Proposed Rule-
making) (rejecting the creamskimming argument); In re Establishment of Policies and Proce-
dures for Consideration of Application to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the
Domestic Public Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts
21, 43, and 61 of the Commission's Rules, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 914-15 (1971) (First Report and
Order) (rejecting the creamskimming argument leveled against new entrants to the markets for
point-to-point microwave radio service); In re the Applications of Cities Service Oil Co. for
Authority to Construct an Earth Station on a Drilling Platform in the Gulf of Mexico, Western
Union Telegraph Co. for Section 214 Authority to Provide Domestic Satellite Communication
Services to Offshore Drilling Platforms and for Authority to Construct Additional Transmitters
at its Glenwood, N.J., and Cedar Hill, Tex., Earth Stations, 51 F.C.C.2d 653, 664-67 (1975)
(Memorandum Opinion, Order, and Authorization) (rejecting the creamskimmer argument
raised by Offshore Telephone Company that prospective competitor Western Union be restricted
from establishing channels of communications for the provision of domestic satellite communi-
cations services to offshore drilling platforms); In re International Communications Policies
Governing Designation of Recognized Private Operating Agencies, Grants of IRUs in Interna-
tional Facilities and Assignment of Data Network Identification Codes, 95 F.C.C.2d 627, 646
n.27 (1983) (Notice of Inquiry) (rejecting the argument that non-carrier cable indefeasible rights
of users (IRUs) are a form of creamskimming).
68. In May 1988, a fire in an Illinois Bell central office caused 35,000 to 45,000 customers
to lose telecommunications service for nearly a month. See Larson & Mudd, supra note 4. It was
estimated that this loss of service cost United Airlines as many as 7,000 reservation calls a day!
Hersch, supra note 55, at 34. In this regard, the ability to have more than one link to the outside
world, that is, "redundancy," would be attractive, if not necessary. Id.
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businesses handling millions of transactions daily. 69 To many custom-
ers, these networks offer the perfect complement, or back-up, to cur-
rent telecommunications networks by providing the security of having
two networks to accommodate increased traffic, to ensure against any
loss in communication links, and to take advantage of the most ad-
vanced services offered by a variety of telecommunications provi-
ders. 70
As a policy matter, the minimal threat to universal basic service
posed by "downtown loops" is counterbalanced by the societal bene-
fits of greater efficiency and security in telecommunications systems.
Furthermore, the threat to universal basic service is diminishing as
LECs, such as Pacific Bell and New York Telephone, install their own
downtown fiber loops in order to retrieve lost corporate clients and'
restore lost profits.
71
Despite the above mentioned obstacles, CAP networks are blossom-
ing throughout the country. In fact, since 1987, the CAP industry has
expanded from only three networks in three cities to over forty net-
works in major cities across the country.7" Economic projections esti-
mate that the competitive access industry will be one of the most
profitable industries in the "Information Age." 73 By the end of this
decade, CAPs could conceivably capture gross revenues in excess of
$40 billion nationwide due to their ability to provide new and useful
services to the consumer that are not offered via many of the existing
LEC networks.74
B. Cable Television Systems
In addition to the services provided by CAPs, fiber-optic technol-
ogy has enabled cable television providers to deliver telecommunica-
69. See Hersch, supra note 55, at 35.
70. Id. at 34-35.
71. Gary Slutsker, What Should We Be?, FORBES, Sept. 28, 1992, at 132, 136. Despite the
emerging competition in the industry, LECs still control virtually all local access services. AT&T
recently stated that 99.866% of their local access service is handled by local exchange carriers.
Competitors Ask Strict Rules on Determining Local Carrier Competition, Comm. DAILY, Mar.
25, 1993, at 1.
72. Larson & Mudd, supra note 4, at 274. These estimates may be very conservative as
Florida currently possesses 14 certified competitive access providers. FLA. PUB. SERV. COMM'N,
DIRECTORY OF UTILITIES 1 (1993).
73. GOLDMAN SACHS, COMMUNICOPIA: A DIGITAL COMMUNICATION BOUNTY 21 (July 1992);
see also, Maney, supra note 6, at 2B.
74. SACHS, supra note 73, at 21. Since 1987, the CAP industry's revenues have increased
from nearly zero to over $160 million earned from by-pass service alone. Coy, supra note 49, at
100.
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tions services." In fact, subsidiaries of companies such as Time-
Warner, Adelphia, Comcast, Paragon, Selkirk, and Continental
Cablevision, hold Florida CAP certificates, which allow them to com-
pete with the LECs in providing telecommunications services. 76 The
coaxial/fiber-optic networks used by cable systems to provide video to
homes and businesses can also provide telecommunications services of
higher quality than the antiquated LEC networks which rely on
twisted-pairs of copper wire. 77 Along with the increase in quality, this
combination of coaxial and fiber-optic cable employed by the cable
companies allows them to incorporate a greater array of technological
advances than the current LEC networks. 78
Through the use of fiber-optic technology and digital switching, ca-
ble systems such as Time-Warner are experimenting with advanced te-
lecommunications networks that provide video telephones, medical
imaging, interactive television, and other variations of high-speed data
transfer. 79 These systems, called integrated broadband networks
(IBNs) or integrated services digital networks (ISDNs), are being de-
veloped by both local exchange telephone companies and cable com-
panies.w0 Many regulators see these "broadband" networks as the
75. SACHS, supra note 73, at 21. See generally, LELAND L. JOHNSON, TELEPHONE COMPANY
ENTRY INTO CABLE TELEVISION (1992). Currently, cable television passes by 90 % of the homes in
the U.S. and could interconnect its home consumers with advanced telecommunications services.
Strachan, supra note 4, at 608. Despite its abilities, legal commentators have noted that cable
operators face significant barriers that may impede their ability to compete with LECs in voice
and data markets. See Werner, supra note 4, at 231 n.67. Citing to the hand-in-glove coopera-
tion between the state public service commissions and LECs, commentators have widely noted
continued LEC opposition to cable company advancements into cooperative telecommunications
markets. Id. Florida cable operators have also experienced this type of LEC/PSC opposition to
their attempts to advance telecommunications competition. See discussion infra part IV.
76. See JOHNSON, supra note 75, at 10; see also FLA. PUn. SERV. COMH'N, supra note 72, at
1-4.
77. Gilder, supra note 6, at 81; JOHNSON, supra note 75, at 9. In fact, these twisted pairs of
copper wire dramatically limit the quality and amount of information that can travel across LEC
networks. Maney, supra note 6, at 2B. Some experts say the "twisted pair" places LECs at a
"competitive disadvantage" with telecommunications providers that use coaxial or fiber-optic
wires throughout their networks. Id. Put bluntly, the twisted pair can neither carry as much
information nor offer the clarity of coaxial and fiber-optic wires.
78. See Maney, supra note 6, at 2B. One example of how cable companies are taking ad-
vantage of their networks is found in Queens, New York. Currently, over 10,000 customers of
Time Warner Cable in Queens are receiving 150 channels, including 90 conventional cable chan-
nels and 60 pay-per-view movie channels. The cost of this increased service is only $23.95 - the
same as most basic cable services. Gilder, supra note 6, at 82.
79. See generally Time-Warner Press Release pp. 1-3 (on file with the author).
80. The FCC has defined these networks as communications networks with a minimum
transmission rate of 150 Megabits per second, compiled of fiber-optic cable (or, to a lesser ex-
tent, coaxial cable) and capable of transmitting video, data, and voice on the same system. Wer-
ner, supra note 4, at n.58 (citing R. PEPPER, FEDERAL COMUNICATIONS COMWIssIoN, THROUGH
THE LOOKING GLASS: INTEGRATED BROADBAND NETwORxs, REGULATING POLICY AND INSTITU-
TIONAL CHANGE 5 (1988)).
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future networks of the "Information Age," due to their wide range of
telecommunications capabilities."
C. Wireless Networks
Microwave, satellite, and cellular communications networks also
add to the competitive environment of the telecommunications indus-
try. These networks offer consumers the ability to communicate di-
rectly with others without the hindrances of the local access
"bottleneck. ' 8 2 In addition, these systems give consumers the advan-
tage of "wireless" interconnection with long-distance providers as
well as with LEC and CAP networks.83
This "wireless" form of communication offers a competitive threat
to LECs and CAPs as vast networks are set-up to offer a complete
bypass of the current local communications networks.8 Currently, to-
tal wireless networks, called personal communications networks
(PCNs), are in the experimental phase.8" Some suggest that these net-
works will "eventually render the wired local telephone monopolies
passe." '8 6 Proponents envision these new telephone networks as using
light, inexpensive handsets that will communicate via low-power an-
tennas, much like cellular telephones.87 LECs and CAPs are threat-
ened by the idea that PCNs may rival the current wired systems in
both cost and convenience88 by providing communication at drasti-
cally reduced prices affordable to most Americans.89
81. See JOHNSON, supra note 75, at 3; CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 4-5; see also Barrett,
supra note 4, at 86, 95-97.
82. See CRANDALL, supra note 9, at 4, 75, 162; Gilder, supra note 6, at 83.
83. See generally Thomas A. Monheim, Personal Communications Services: The Wireless
Future of Telecommunications, 44 FED. Comm. L.J. 335 (1992).
84. See also Peter Coy & Mark Lewyn, Future Phone? The PCN is a Wireless to Watch,
Bus. WEEK, Mar. 25, 1991, at 101; Maney, supra note 6, at 2B; Monheim, supra note 83; Alex-
ander C. Larson & Terrence J. Schroepfer, New Telecommunications Technologies and Regula-
tion: The Case of Personal Communications Services, 6 HIrH TECH. L.J. 271 (1991).
85. Through 1991, the FCC had awarded approximately 40 two-year experimental authori-
zations to applicants seeking to develop technology associated with PCNs. Werner, supra note 4,
at 232 n.68.
86. Coy & Lewyn, supra note 84, at 101.
87. Id. Currently, Time Warner Cable is testing a network which uses a 12-ounce phone
that closely resembles current portable phones. Rene Stutzman, Time Warner to Test Cable-
Phone Service, THE ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 15, 1993, at C4. The difference from other cellular
phones is that these phones allow a person to be called at home, in the car, or at the office using
only one phone number. Id.
88. See Stutzman, supra note 87, at C4. The PCN market will probably reach $30 billion in
revenues by the year 2000. Thomas McCarroll, A Giant Tug-of- Wire, TIME, Feb. 24, 1992, at 36,
41.
89. See Stutzman, supra note 87, at C4. These low costs should result from the use of
technology currently employed by cable television companies, in that cable television systems are
more efficient than current LEC systems in tying a PCN together in an urban center. Geraldine
Fabrikant, US West Will Buy into Time Warner, WALL ST. J., at C5.
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With the emergence of these new providers, the telecommunications
marketplace harbors many alternatives to the current LEC networks,
whose stronghold on even the basic telephone monopoly may be num-
bered. 90 In the face of this changing environment, regulatory bodies,
such as the FPSC, must prepare to accommodate these new providers
and to ensure a fair and competitive marketplace for their services.
III. THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE: CHAPTER 364
As the industry grows more competitive, Florida lawmakers and re-
gulators must deal with the technological advancements and emerging
telecommunications service providers of the "Information Age."
Florida's method of dealing with these new providers is found in
chapter 364, Florida Statutes, and in the decisions and orders of the
FPSC.
Since 1913, the Florida Legislature has provided the statutory foun-
dation for the FPSC's intrastate regulation of the telecommunications
industry dominated by the AT&T monopoly.9 ' In 1981, the Legisla-
ture made chapter 364 subject to mandatory sunset review every ten
years, 92 with the first such review to occur in 1990. 91 In 1991, the man-
datory sunset review provisions were repealed;9 accordingly, unless
future legislatures choose to reevaluate the chapter's mandates, the
1990 sunset review will remain the only comprehensive review of chap-
ter 364.
As previously mentioned, 9 wide-ranging changes took place in the
telecommunications industry between 1980 and 1989. While state re-
gulators strained to keep pace with technological breakthroughs, the
country's regulatory scheme was also changing. The industry evolved
from one dominated by the AT&T monopoly into a competitive in-
dustry with relaxed regulation for most segments. Throughout this
decade of change, basic local exchange service, however, continued to
remain an effective monopoly.9
90. Despite this promise, to advance beyond existing LEC networks, these providers and
their networks of the future require costly new technological breakthroughs in areas such as
switching. Barrett, supra note 4, at 88-90.
91. Fla. Compiled Laws Title 3, ch. 2, Art. 7, §§ 2829-2829z (1914).
92. See generally FLA. STAT. § 364.01 n. 1 (1991).
93. Ch. 81-318, § 2, 1981 Fla. Laws 1490, 1497 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 11.6105(7)(a)
(1981)).
94. Ch. 91-429, § 4(2)(h), 1991 Fla. Laws 83, 96.
95. See discussion supra notes 15-49 and accompanying text.
96. See generally FLA. STAT. § 364.337 (Supp. 1988); In re Intrastate access charges for toll
use of local exchange services, Docket No. 820537, Order No. 13912 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
Dec. 11, 1984); In re Intrastate telephone access charges for toll use of local exchange services,
Docket No. 820537, Order No. 16343 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, July 14, 1986).
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Between 1980 and 1990, Florida's regulatory structure was changed
in response to a national trend towards increased competition. The
changes were piecemeal and limited to specific areas of the growing
telecommunications industry in Florida.97 While acknowledging the
emergence of some competitive telecommunications services, amend-
ments to chapter 364 were sporadic and did not represent the compre-
hensive review and revision of the chapter necessary to accommodate
the significant technological developments occurring throughout the
telecommunications industry.
In 1990, pursuant to the sunset review requirements, the Florida
Legislature, by a near unanimous vote, 98 reenacted a revised chapter
364, with a host of changes that seemed to reflect the national trend
toward deregulation and competition in the telecommunications mar-
ketplaceP 9 Not since the creation of the Public Service Commission in
97. See Ch. 82-51, § 4, 1982 Fla. Laws 122, 124 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 364.337 (1983))
(parameters for certifying duplicate telephone services); Ch. 84-83, 1984 Fla. Laws 254 (amend-
ing FLA. STAT. § 364.337) (reevaluating regulatory assessment fees paid by interexchange carri-
ers); Ch. 85-327, 1985 Fla. Laws 1969 (amending FLA. STAT. § 364.335) (allowing increased
competition in the pay telephone docket); Ch. 86-270, 1986 Fla. Laws 2014 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 364.339 (1987)) (attempt to increase competition in the shared tenant services market);
Ch. 89-163, 1989 Fla. Laws 574 (recognizing the emergence of competition and the changes
throughout the telecommunications marketplace and requiring the FPSC to present a report
summarizing the status of competition in the telecommunications industry to the 1990 Legisla-
ture during its sunset review of chapter 364).
98. FLA. LEoIS., FINAL LEGISLATrIVE BILL INORMATION, 1990 REoULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
SENATE BILLS at 194, SB 2398. The bill passed the House by a vote of 115 Yeas, I Nay, and
unanimously passed the Senate. Id.
99. See Ch. 90-244, 1990 Fla. Laws 1802 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 364.01 et setl. (1991)).
The substantive changes, which reflected many of the national trends, were as follows: 1) refer-
ences to telephone companies were changed to telecommunications companies in recognition of
the emerging telecommunications providers that are not telephone companies; 2) broad intent
language to provide direction to the FPSC for the regulation of telecommunications was added;
3) several terms such as "monopoly service," "private line service," "telecommunications com-
pany," and "telecommunications facility" were defined; 4) LECs were required to file informa-
tion every four or five years to ascertain whether their rates and charges are reasonable and not
unjustly discriminatory; 5) the FPSC was granted the freedom to establish alternative methods
for regulating telecommunications providers and their services that will implement new technolo-
gies and promote efficiency and productivity in the telecommunications marketplace; 6) the
FPSC's ability to monitor and investigate telecommunications companies for anticompetitive be-
havior such as cross-subsidization was expanded; 7) the FPSC was allowed to certify competitive
access providers; 8) a regulatory scheme for PAT telephone service providers was outlined; 9) the
FPSC was empowered to determine which telecommunications markets are competitive and
should therefore be deregulated in accordance with the public interest; 10) the cross-subsidiza-
tion of competitive markets with revenues from monopolistic telecommunications services was
banned; and I 1) the FPSC was required to report biannually to the Legislature on the advance-
ment of competition in the telecommunications industry and the successes of alternative regula-
tory treatments of those markets.
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1913 had the Florida Legislature expressed such clear fundamental in-
tent with regard to telephone regulation. The legislative intent provi-
sions of the bill recognized the emerging competition in the
telecommunications industry and set forth umbrella principles for
prospective Commission regulation of the industry in Florida.l°° The
Legislature instructed the FPSC as follows:
(3) The commission shall exercise its exclusive jurisdiction in order
to:
(c) Encourage cost-effective technological innovation and
competition in the telecommunications industry if doing so will
benefit the public by making modern and adequate
telecommunications services available at reasonable prices.
(d) Ensure that all providers of telecommunications services are
treated fairly, by preventing anticompetitive behavior and
eliminating unnecessary regulatory restraint.
(e) Recognize the continuing emergence of a competitive
telecommunications environment through the flexible regulatory
treatment of competitive telecommunications services .... 101
The Legislature also took note of the growing trend toward competi-
tion and deregulation in the industry partially caused by the MFJ and
empowered the FPSC to determine the presence of "effective compe-
tition" in specific service markets within the state and to encourage
competition among telecommunications providers when it was in the
public interest:"02
(1) As a result of the court-ordered divestiture of the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company and other changes in regulatory
policies of the Federal Government, and due to technological
advances in telecommunications equipment, the Legislature finds
that competitive offerings of certain types of telecommunications
services may under certain circumstances be in the best interest of the
people of the state. It is the legislative intent that, where the
commission finds that a telecommunications service is effectively
competitive, market conditions be allowed to set prices so long as
predatory pricing is precluded, monopoly ratepayers be protected
100. Id. § 1, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1804 (amending FLA. STAT. § 364.01 (1989)).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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from paying excessive rates and charges, and both ratepayers and
competitors be protected from regulated telecommunications services
subsidizing competitive telecommunications services.
(2) A determination as to whether a specific service provided by a
local exchange telecommunications company is subject to effective
competition may be made on motion by the commission or on
petition of the telecommunications company or any interested
party. 103
The essence of this new provision is to empower the FPSC to deter-
mine where telecommunications competition exists and to what degree
regulation of competitive services will benefit Florida telecommunica-
tions consumers.
In addition to supporting competition, the 1990 revision recognized
a new classification of telecommunications services provider, the "al-
ternative access vendor" (AAV). 104 Under Florida law, an AAV may
be certified by the FPSC I05 to provide "private line service '6 between
an entity and its facilities at another location or dedicated access serv-
ice between an end-user and an interexchange carrier by other than
a[n] [LEC]."107
In Florida, AAVs or CAPs are permitted to create metropolitan ac-
cess networks to which telecommunications consumers may subscribe
for connection to their long-distance carrier.'01 Unlike their counter-
parts in other states, however, AAVs are not statutorily permitted to
interconnect "unaffiliated entities" along their networks. 109 The
FPSC's interpretation of what constitutes an "affiliated entity" has
further narrowed the scope of the available customer base." 0 As a re-
103. Id.
104. Id. § 34, 1990 Fla. Laws at 1823 (amending FLA. STAT. § 364.337(3)(a) (1989)). Under
Florida law, an AAV is directly analogous to a competitive access provider (CAP), which is
discussed supra part II.A.
105. FLA. SrAT. § 364.337(3)(a) (1991). Certification is dependent upon an evaluation of
whether such an award is in the "public interest." Id. Factors considered prior to certification
include: the number of firms providing the service; the geographic availability of the service
from other firms; the quality of service available from alternative suppliers; the effect on tele-
communications service rates charged to customers of other companies; and any other factors
the Commission considers relevant to the public interest. Id. § 364.337(2).
106. Private line service means "any point-to-point or point-to-multipoint service dedicated
to the exclusive use of an end-user for the transmission of any public telecommunications serv-
ice." FLA. STAT. § 364.335(3) (1991). This service, provided by CAPs or AAVs, travels along a
line solely dedicated to a particular entity. It offers the greatest threat to the LECs since they are
bypassed altogether. See discussion supra part II.A.
107. FLA. STAT. § 364.337(3)(a) (1991).
108. Hersch, supra note 55, at 34.
109. See FLA. STAT. § 364.337(3)(a) (1991).
110. The FPSC undertook an investigatory docket into AAV certification and service in
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sult of this regulatory restraint, only large volume customers that have
subsidiary companies may take full advantage of Florida's AAV net-
works."' Subsequently, AAVs in Florida offer unrestricted competi-
tion to LECs only in the area of long-distance access, not in private
line service or switched local access." 2
The Legislature gave the FPSC the limited power to define the
scope of AAV service and to establish a regulatory climate to protect
both the competitive market and universal service. Because Florida is
one of the first states to legally recognize and certify this form of
competitive access provider, it was initially thought to be on the cut-
ting edge of telecommunications regulatory advancement."3 This sen-
timent has faded, however, as the FPSC, after three years, has failed
to recognize any telecommunications service as "competitive" under
the new chapter. Additionally, the progress of competitive telecom-
munications markets has slowed because the Commission has pro-
vided only limited protections for competitive telecommunications
providers.
IV. THE FLORIDA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION'S REACTION
The 1990 amendments to chapter 364 seemed to be a clear mandate
for the FPSC to investigate and determine which areas of the telecom-
munications industry are competitive and to then foster competitive
market conditions for telecommunications services and their providers
in those areas. In commenting on her interpretation of the new law,
Public Service Commissioner Susan Clark stated that "what the Leg-
islature has said to the Commission is that where competition exists
we can be assured that it will drive rates to cost and that consumers
will have a quality variety of service at a reasonable price.""H4 Com-
missioner Clark added that she believed the law instructed the FPSC
to "back away and no longer regulate [competitive] services and turn
them over to competition and let it work."", As discussed below,
1989. See generally In re Generic investigation into the operations of alternative access vendors,
Docket No. 890183-TL, Order No. 24877 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Aug. 2, 1991). This docket
was postponed and reevaluated after Section 364.337, Florida Statutes, was passed. The result of
this investigation was to define the phrase "and its facilities" as affiliated entities or "those
corporations, partnerships, proprietorships, or other groups that hold stock in excess of 50 per-
cent of the stock of the entity which claims to be affiliated." Id. at 8. This definition severely
limited the spectrum of AAV service.
Ill. See Hersch, supra note 55, at 34.
112. Id. at 37 (quoting ex-FPSC Commissioner Tom Beard).
113. Id.
114. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Bus. and Prof. Reg., tape recording of proceedings (Feb. 18,
1993) (on file with comm.) (testimony of Susan Clark).
115. Id.
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however, during the three-and-one half years since the sunset review
of chapter 364, the FPSC has neither identified any telecommunica-
tions service as "competitive," nor implemented any measures to as-
sure the protection of providers.
The first opportunity for the Commission to formally address the
issues of competition and competitive providers arrived three months
after the Legislature completed its sunset review of chapter 364. On
August 24, 1990, the Florida Pay Telephone Association (FPTA) and
the Florida Cable Television Association (FCTA) petitioned" 6 the
FPSC to "commence an investigatory proceeding to permit a compre-
hensive review of the revisions to chapter 364, Florida Statutes.""117 In
their petition, these associations, representing potential competitive te-
lecommunications providers, suggested that the Commission "receive
input from all interested persons and move forward expeditiously to
116. Formal proceedings before the FPSC are generally initiated by application, petition,
complaint, or order. See generally FLA. A aIN. CODE ANN. r. 25-22.036 (1993). A petition is
appropriate when:
A person subject to Commission jurisdiction seeks authority to change its rates or
service, or seeks some other Commission action not otherwise specified in these rules;
or
A substantially affected person seeks Commission action to change the rates or service
of a person subject to Commission jurisdiction, or seeks some other Commission ac-
tion not otherwise specified in these rules.
Id. at r. 25-22.036(4). In acting on a petition, the FPSC may either: 1) deny the petition if it does
not adequately state a substantial interest or if it is untimely; 2) issue a notice of proposed
agency action allowing for time for responsive pleadings; 3) set the matter for hearing before the
Commission or hearing officer; or 4) dispose of the matter as provided in section 120.57(2),
Florida Statutes. Id. at r. 25-22.036(9)(b).
If the petition is accepted and a docket is opened, the Commission will set dates for work-
shops and preheating conferences during which witnesses will be identified, basic positions out-
lined, and issues refined. Id. at r. 25-22.038(3). The FPSC staff generally uses these prehearing
workshops and conferences to solidify the issues and arrive at acceptable stipulations with the
parties. While most of these prehearing meetings are not mandatory, all parties must attend the
final scheduled prehearing conference at which the parties must advise the prehearing officer as
to issues known to be in dispute as well as the parties' positions on those issues. Id. at r. 25-
22.036(4)(c). Following this final preheating conference, the prehearing officer prepares a pre-
hearing order that outlines the issues in the case, the positions of all parties, recommendations
by the FPSC staff, and any other matters which may aid in the "efficient and fair disposition of
the proceeding." Id. at r. 25-22.036(5).
After the prehearing order is issued, a hearing is held before the Commission, which includes
witness testimony and the like. Each party is permitted to file post-hearing briefs that may in-
clude proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, recommended orders, and legal dissertations
on the issues of the case. Id. at r. 25-22.056(lXb). A final order, which includes a statement of
the issues, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and statement of final Commission action must
be entered by the Commission within 90 days after the hearing. Id. at r. 25-22.059(1).
117. In re Petition of the Florida Pay Telephone Association and the Florida Cable Televi-
sion Association to commence an investigatory proceeding to permit a comprehensive review of
the revisions to Chapter 364, Florida Statutes, enacted during the 1990 Legislative session,
Docket No. 900720-TP, Order No. 23958, at 1 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Jan. 4, 1991).
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implement the new legislation in a coordinated manner designed to
promote the broadest interests of all concerned with bringing quality
telecommunications to the consumers of this State." 1 8 Recognizing
the novel approach to intrastate telecommunications regulation posed
by chapter 364, the petitioners further requested that the FPSC "initi-
ate a proceeding to evaluate: (1) all existing rules, and (2) all existing
generic orders of prospective effect, to ascertain and effectuate their
conformance with the ongoing forward intent" of the 1990 sunset re-
visions. 119
The petitioners suggested, as one of their major concerns, that the
commission safeguard emerging competitive telecommunications mar-
kets by preventing the LECs from engaging in certain anticompetitive
behavior expressly forbidden by the Legislature. 20 The petition by
FPTA and FCTA requested that the FPSC implement a cost method-
ology study, the results of which would assist the Commission in
promulgating rules specifying methods of detecting and disciplining
anticompetitive behavior. 2' Recognizing the possibility that the LECs
would use predatory tactics in competitive markets, the petitioners
further requested an investigation into the possibility of LEC cross-
subsidization of competitive markets and unfair concessions to com-
petitive LEC subsidiaries in their use of the local exchange network.,22
The FPTA and FCTA filed this petition in hopes it would hasten
the Commission's implementation of the new law and determination
of the parameters of competition within the blossoming telecommuni-
cations market. The Commission, however, rejected the FPTA/FCTA
initiative. 123 Citing limited time constraints, the Commission adopted
118. Joint Petition for investigation and implementation of Florida Statutes Chapter 364
1990 revisions, In re Petition of the Florida Pay Telephone Association and the Florida Cable
Television Association to commence an investigatory proceeding to permit a comprehensive re-
view of the revisions to Chapter 364, Florida Statutes, enacted during the 1990 Legislative ses-
sion, Docket No. 900720-TP, at 2 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Aug. 24, 1990) [hereinafter Joint
Petitionl.
119. Id. at4.
120. Id. at 8. Regulators throughout the country believe that LECs, due to their market
power and control over the local access bottleneck, have the power and incentive to engage in
anticompetitive behavior in competitive markets. See Schwartz & Hoagg, supra note 4, at 286.
121. Joint Petition, supra note 118, at 9. Regulators use a uniform cost methodology to
determine the cost of each individual telecommunications service provided by a regulated entity
in order to evaluate whether each service is cost-justified or if certain services are being subsi-
dized by other more profitable services. See In re Development of local exchange company cost
study methodology, Docket No. 900633-TL, Order No. 23474 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Sept.
12, 1990) (general discussion of the importance of uniform cost methodologies); Alexander C.
Larson, Cost Allocations, Predation, and Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications, 14 J. CorP.
L. 377 (1988).
122. Joint Petition, supra note 118, at 8-9.
123. In re Petition of the Florida Pay Telephone Association and the Florida Cable Televi-
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the staff recommendation of dismissal and ruled that the generic in-
vestigatory docket proposed by the parties would provide few solu-
tions to the questions raised by the new legislation.'2 4 Instead, the
FPSC deferred the questions to an issue-by-issue analysis to be raised
in a "proper contextual framework." 25
The first "proper contextual framework" arose in the LEC Cost
Study Methodology docket opened by the FPSC on September 12,
1990.126 In its order initiating the docket, the Commission noted that
"[t]he introduction of competition in the telephone industry raises
new issues such as anticompetitive pricing of end-user services and ac-
cess services and the imputation of monopoly service element prices as
a cost to LEC-provided competitive services.' ' 27 Echoing the senti-
ments of the dismissed FPTA/FCTA petition, the Commission fur-
ther stressed that "[p]rotection of ratepayers and competitors against
predatory pricing now looms as an increasing concern."'' 2 As a tool
to prevent such "predatory pricing," the FPSC recognized the need
for a uniform cost methodology to be applied to LEC telecommunica-
tions services offerings. 2 9
Following a series of workshops, the FPSC expanded the scope of
the proceeding and created a special task force "to investigate issues
relating to cross-subsidization between monopoly and competitive
services."' 30 Based on recommendations from this task force, the
Commission refined the issues of the docket to four key items:
1) the development of a costing methodology which generates cost
results for individual services;
2) the definition of cross-subsidy of effectively competitive LEC
services by monopoly LEC services consistent with the requirements
of Chapter 364;
3) the appropriate means for detecting the presence of cross-
subsidization; and
sion Association to commence an investigatory proceeding to permit a comprehensive review of
the revisions to Chapter 364, Florida Statutes, enacted during the 1990 Legislative session,
Docket No. 900720-TP, Order No. 23958, at 3 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Jan. 4, 1991).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. In re Development of local exchange company cost study methodology, Docket No.
900633-TL, Order No. 24910 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Aug. 13, 1991).
127. Id. at 1.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2.
130. In re Development of local exchange company cost study methodology, Docket No.
900633-TL, Order No. 24910, at I (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Aug. 13, 1991).
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4) the proper treatment of shared costs to ensure that they are
recovered in a fair and equitable manner from the LEC's various
services. 131
Concerned that "meaningful progress in the docket will be ham-
pered" by the broad issues raised by the task force, the Commission
relegated the issues of cross-subsidization to a separate proceeding by
opening another investigatory docket."'
The FPSC opened this cross-subsidization docket on August 13,
1991, to address the definitional standards of competitive service of-
ferings and the regulatory safeguards required to prevent cross-subsi-
dization of such services by LECs. 33 Despite offering another early
opportunity to address the competitive issues presented in the sunset
review of chapter 364, no definitive policies emerged from this docket
for almost two years. 34 While the cost-methodology and cross-subsi-
131. Id. at 2.
132. Id. at 5. The FPSC has not yet rendered a formal order on cost methodology of LEC
services. Despite a delay of over three years, the final order is not expected until late 1993. See
Case and Scheduling Report, In re Development of local exchange company cost study method-
ology, Docket No. 900633-TL (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, June 15, 1993).
133. In re Investigation into the regulatory safeguards required to prevent cross-subsidization
by telephone companies, Docket No. 910757-TP, Order No. 25816, at 1 (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, Feb. 27, 1992).
134. See Case and Scheduling Report, In re Investigation into the regulatory safeguards re-
quired to prevent cross-subsidization by telephone companies, Docket No. 910757-TP (Fla. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, Dec. 2, 1992). The cross-subsidization docket was decided on July 12, 1993, over
three years after the 1990 sunset revision of chapter 364. In re Investigation into the regulatory
safeguards required to prevent cross-subsidization by telephone companies, Docket No. 910757-
TP, Order No. PSC-93-1015-FOF-TP (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, July 12, 1993). In its order, the
FPSC stated that cross-subsidization exists "when competitive services are priced below their
incremental costs, and the resulting revenue shortfall is recovered through the rates for monop-
oly services." Id. at 7. The FPSC added that "the presence of cross-subsidization can be deter-
mined by comparing the revenues generated from a service with the relevant costs of providing
the service, or, equivalently, a service's price with its relevant unit cost." Id. at 8. While offering
some promise for competitive telecommunications providers, the FPSC has still not declared any
services as "competitive" to trigger the protections of section 364.3381, Florida Statutes. Fur-
thermore, this order fails to protect potential competitive telecommunications markets from
other abuses of LEC market powers. LECs may still: (1) pay more than fair market price for
products or services received from their subsidiaries or affiliated companies; (2) accept less than
fair market price for products or services provided to their subsidiaries or affiliated companies;
(3) refuse to bear their share of the costs of providing the service, including a prorated share of
overhead, by allowing the cost to be enveloped by revenues received from monopoly services; (4)
provide services to their own competitive activity under rates, terms, and conditions more favor-
able than a competitor would pay; and (5) provide services to their own competitive services but
refuse to provide their competitors with the same services. Id. at 13. These anticompetitive prac-
tices, which the FPSC has chosen not to prohibit, have prompted competitive pay telephone
telecommunications providers to file a lawsuit. Peoples Tel. Co. v. BellSouth Telecommunica-
tions, Inc., No. 93-1260 (S.D. Fla. filed July 1, 1993). These competitive pay telephone providers
are seeking damages and injunctive relief pursuant to state and federal civil antitrust claims aris-
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dization dockets languished, the FCTA filed a second petition on Feb-
ruary 26, 1992, in an effort to prompt the Commission to take more
immediate steps to implement the competitive elements of the 1990
sunset review of chapter 364.135
In its second petition, the FCTA requested that the Commission re-
quire "each local exchange telecommunications company which offers
both monopoly and competitive telecommunications services . . . to
'segregate its intrastate investments and expenses in accordance with
allocation methodologies as prescribed by the Commission . "... '136
Citing to the direct language of the sunset review of chapter 364, the
petitioner asked the Commission to respond to the mandates of the
Legislature by requiring LECs to disclose segregated financial data
with regard to competitive and monopoly services. 3 7
One of the chief concerns of opponents of the second FCTA peti-
tion was the unresolved issue of the appropriate definitions of "com-
petitive" or "effectively competitive" services under chapter 364.138
ing under section 2 of the Sherman Act, sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, as well as sections
542.19, 542.22, and 542.23, Florida Statutes. The lawsuit arose from Southern Bell's alleged use
of its monopoly power to gain and maintain its competitive advantage in Florida's pay telephone
market by, in part, "not charging or imputing to its pay telephone business the same costs for its
essential facilities which independent pay telephone providers . . .are charged for use of the
same essential facilities." Plaintiff's Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 14, Peoples Tel.
Co. v. Bell South Telecommunications, Inc., No. 93-1260 (S.D. Fla. filed July 1, 1993).
135. In re Petition by Florida Cable Television Association to institute annual reporting of
allocations for investments and expenses of local exchange telecommunications companies,
Docket No. 920178-TL, Order No. PSC-92-0317-FOF-TL, at I (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, May
8, 1992).
136. Id.; In re Petition by Florida Cable Television Association to institute annual reporting
of allocations for investments and expenses of local exchange telecommunications companies,
Docket No. 920178, Order No. PSC-92-0317-FOF-TL (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., Feb. 26,
1992).
137. In re Petition by Florida Cable Television Association to institute annual reporting of
allocations for investments and expenses of local exchange telecommunications companies,
Docket No. 920178-TL, Order No. PSC-92-0317-FOF-TL, at 2 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Feb.
26, 1992).
138. Despite being contrary to a basic tenet of statutory construction that a "statute should
be so construed as to give a meaning to every word and phrase in it," Vocelle v. Knight Bros.
Paper Co., 118 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960), the FPSC has stated that the terms "com-
petitive," "effectively competitive," and "subject to effective competition" used in chapter 364
refer to the same thing. See In re Investigation to determine whether local exchange company
pay telephone service (LEC PATS) is competitive and whether local exchange company pay tele-
phone service (LEC PATS) should be regulated differently, Docket No. 920255-TL, Order No.
PSC-93-0289-FOF-TL, at 10 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Feb. 23, 1993). Citing the Legislature's
omission of differing definitions of these terms, the Commission stated that all three terms have
identical meanings within the context of the Florida pay telephone market. Id. at 11. Accord-
ingly, the Commission found that only two types of services exist: monopoly and effectively
competitive services. Id. at 10-11. While inapposite to widely accepted precedent, this sentiment
has been echoed by the FPSC staff and local exchange telephone companies as applicable to all
1993]
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As pointed out by David Dowds, a senior communications analyst
with the FPSC, "this Commission has not made any finding that any
particular regulated services, in fact, are subject to competition."''3 9
This point was further reinforced by Commissioner Betty Easley who
questioned, "if we haven't issued an order defining which is competi-
tive and which is monopoly, how do you expect [us] to honor [the]
petition? ' ' 140 On this premise, the FPSC deemed the petition prema-
ture and, once again, denied the relief requested by the FCTA. 4, The
debate on the petition, however, did underscore the fact that, after
over two years, the FPSC had failed to adopt any policy defining the
nature of "competitive services," despite the legislative directives to
categorize and encourage the competitive services marketplace. 42
In its recommendation to the Commission in the cross-subsidization
docket on how and when the new law should be implemented, the
FPSC staff stated:
[olnce a service is found to be effectively competitive in accord with
the provisions of Section 364.338, the cross-subsidization restraints
of Section 364.3381 become operative. Cross-subsidization exists
when effectively competitive services are priced below their relevant
telecommunications markets. See In re Investigation into the regulatory safeguards required to
prevent cross-subsidization by telephone companies, Docket No. 910757-TP, Prehearing Order,
at 23 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Feb. 27, 1993). While this interpretation may seem clear on its
face, it does not change the fact that in the three-and-one-half years since the sunset review of
chapter 364, no universal definition has been given to any of these terms to guide telecommuni-
cations providers or their regulators.
139. Agenda Conference Hearing Transcript at 14, In re Petition by Florida Cable Television
Association to institute annual reporting of allocations for investments and expenses of local
exchange telecommunications companies, Docket No. 920178-TL (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
May 5, 1992).
140. Id. at 18.
141. In re Petition by Florida Cable Television Association to institute annual reporting of
allocations for investments and expenses of local exchange telecommunications companies,
Docket No. 920178-TL, Order No. PSC-92-0317-FOF-TL, at 3 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, May
8, 1992). The FPSC noted the FCTA's concerns and stated: "While we deny FCTA's petition,
we acknowledge the Petitioner's concerns and direct our staff to investigate the matter in the
upcoming rate cases and the cross subsidization docket." Id. The first of such rate cases was
decided seven months later as the FPSC granted GTE a rate increase. See In re Application for a
rate increase by GTE Florida Incorporated, Docket No. 920188-TL, Order No. PSC-93-0108-
FOF-TL (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Jan. 21, 1993). The final order revealed no such direction to
the staff to investigate the allocations concerns FCTA enumerated. Id. at 121-30. Furthermore,
no evidence was supplied by the staff on the issue of "competitive services." Id. at 121-24. The
aspects of cost allocation reporting and "competitive services" were reasserted by the FCTA and
the Commission dismissed them for lack of basis in the record. Id. at 122, 124-25. Thus, despite
the FPSC's testament to deal with these issues "in upcoming rate cases," the FPSC avoided its
first opportunity to follow through on its statement.
142. See Ch. 90-244, 1990 Fla. Laws 1802 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 364.338).
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costs, and the resulting revenue shortfall is recovered through the
rates for monopoly services. 43
Despite this relatively clear pronouncement and the emergence of nu-
merous competitive telecommunications providers previously dis-
cussed,'" the Commission has not found any telecommunications
services "effectively competitive,'' 11 4 nor has it provided any definitive
143. In re Investigation into the regulatory safeguards required to prevent cross-subsidization
by telephone companies, Docket No. 910757-TP, Prehearing Order, at 15 (Fla. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, Feb. 27, 1993).
144. See supra notes 59-89 and accompanying text.
145. The Commission has only considered one telecommunciations market to determine
whether or not "effective competition" exists. In February of 1993, the FPSC rendered an order
determining that the pay telephone market is not "effectively competitive" in the State of Flor-
ida. In re Investigation to determine whether local company pay telephone service is competitive
and whether local exchange company pay telephone service should be regulated differently than
it is currently regulated, Docket Nos. 920255-TL & 910590-TL, Order No. PSC-93-0289-FOF-
TL, at 38 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Feb. 23, 1993). In its evaluation of the pay telephone
market, the Commission considered the following factors:.
1. whether market forces effectively constrain and determine pay telephone end user
prices;
2. whether pay telephone service providers differentiate their products from one an-
other through both price and other factors;
3. whether market forces effectively promote economic efficiencies among pay tele-
phone providers;
4. whether market forces effectively suppress excess profits so that profits realized by
pay telephone providers are near the firms' actual costs to provide a service;
5. whether low barriers to entry into the pay telephone market exist;
6. whether end users of pay telephone service are adequately presented with a choice
of alternative suppliers and information about alternative suppliers;
7. whether end users of pay telephone service routinely exercise their option to choose
among suppliers for pay telephone service;
8. whether operation in the pay telephone market by the LEC does not adversely af-
fect the maintenance of basic local exchange service.
Id. at 4-6.
Section 364.338 explicitly states that:
In determining whether a specific service provided by a LEC is subject to effective
competition, the commission shall consider all of thefollowing:
(a) The effect, if any, on the maintenance of basic local exchange telecommunica-
tions service.
(b) The ability of consumers to obtain functionally equivalent services at compara-
ble rates, terms, and conditions.
(c) The ability of competitive providers in the relevant geographic or service market
to make functionally equivalent or substitute services available at competitive rates,
terms, and conditions.
(d) The overall impact of the proposed regulatory change on the continued availabi-
lity of existing services.
(e) Whether the consumers of such service would receive an identifiable benefit
from the provision of the service on a competitive basis.
(f) The degree of regulation necessary to prevent abuses or discrimination in the
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direction in determining which markets are "effectively competitive."
The lack of policy on competitive services has not only prevented
potential competitive telecommunications providers from entering the
market, it has also allowed LECs to continue predatory pricing and
cross-subsidization practices. In a recommendation to the Commis-
sion, the FPSC staff recently stated that the Commission must first
determine which services are competitive before any safeguards pro-
vided by chapter 364 to LEC competitors may be instituted.'4 As a
result, the three-and-a-half-year old mandates of the 1990 sunset revi-
sion have and will continue to be paralyzed until the Commission de-
termines which markets are subject to effective competition.
The FPSC's actions have effectively upheld the status quo of LEC-
dominated telecommunications markets.1 47 At the end of 1992, the
FPSC and its staff retreated from their original position and opened a
generic docket to reevaluate the competitive/monopoly services di-
lemma. 48 This docket will determine which, if any, of the services
provided by the LECs are effectively competitive and what type of
regulation should govern these services.149 The docket directly corre-
sponds to the initial requests of potential competitors in September
1990. This new docket officially opened upon the receipt of material
provision of such service.
(g) Such other relevant factors as are in the public interest.
FLA. STAT. § 364.338(2) (1991) (emphasis added). The Commission categorically rejected this test
stating that "[tlhe characteristics in our definition incorporate all of the market behaviors con-
sidered in the statute: (a), (b), (c), and (e). The other statutory provisions, (d), (f), and (g), are
not relevant to a definition of effective competition." In re Investigation to determine whether
local pay telephone service is competitive and whether local exchange company pay telephone
service should be regulated differently than it is currently regulated, Docket Nos. 920255-TL &
910590-TL, Order No. PSC-93-0289-FOF-TL, at 7 (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Feb. 23, 1993). In
other words, in its first attempt to determine whether a particular service is subject to effective
competition, the FPSC did not follow the mandates of the 1990 Legislature. The Commission,
using its test, stated that although "there is intense competition in the pay telephone market...
for the purpose of securing select locations," there is not sufficient evidence that "end users
shop for pay telephone service." Id. at 12, 14. Subsequently, the status quo was upheld because
no "effective competition" was found to exist in the pay telephone market.
146. Id. at 27.
147. The FPSC recently told the FCC that "providers such as power and cable television
companies could provide beneficial competitive services to residential or small business custom-
ers." In re Expanded interconnection with local telephone company facilities, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369,
7400 (1992). The FPSC's actions over the past four years clearly indicates otherwise as it has
continued to prevent these and any other non-LEC telecommunications providers from provid-
ing any telecommunications services to these types of consumers.
148. See Memorandum from Florida Public Service Commission (Dec. 8, 1992) (requesting
data to identify effectively competitive services); see also In re Investigation into which local
exchange company (LEC) services are effectively competitive, Docket No. 930046-TP (Fla. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n, opened April 2, 1993).
149. Memorandum from Florida Public Service Commission (Dec. 8, 1992).
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from LECs and other affected parties on April 2, 1993.110 The most
optimistic Case and Scheduling Report for the docket does not envi-
sion a final order until sometime in 1994,151 which translates into at
least four years of regulatory delay since the Legislature's mandate in
chapter 364.
V. 1993 LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS: HousE BILL 1531
The FPSC's bureaucratic sluggishness has tempered the emergence
of new telecommunications services made possible by technological
advancements in the industry. In response to the perception of inactiv-
ity, new legislation was introduced in 1993 to provide further guidance
and direction to the FPSC with regard to competitive services. Spon-
sored by Representatives Frederick Lippman,'5 2 Steven A. Geller, "3
and Timothy S. Ireland, 5 4 House Bill 1531 addressed many of the reg-
ulatory questions that have remained unanswered since the passage of
the 1990 sunset revisions.'55 Supporters of this legislation included a
coalition of affected telecommunications providers and consumer
groups, such as the FCTA, FPTA, American Association of Retired
Persons (AARP), Intermedia Communications, Inc. (Florida's largest
AAV), and the Florida Consumer Action Network. 5 6
The legislation, intending to definitively end Florida's regulatory in-
decision over the distinctions between enhanced and basic services and
POTS and information services, offered concrete definitions for "ba-
sic local exchange telecommunications services," "competitive serv-
ices," "effectively competitive services," "monopoly services," and
"cross-subsidization."'5 7 By providing clear and concise definitions,
150. Id.
151. Case and Scheduling Report, In re Investigation, Docket No. 930046-TP.
152. Dem., Hollywood.
153. Dem., Hallandale.
154. Repub., Cape Coral/Ft. Meyers.
155. FLA. LEGIS., FnAL LEGISLATVE BRit INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF
HousE BIsLS at 171, HB 1531. The bill was also cosponsored by Representatives David L.
Thomas, Republican, Sarasota, Luis E. Rojas, Republican, Hialeah, and Michael I. Abrams,
Democrat, North Miami Beach.
156. John Kennedy, Telecommunications Plan Rejected, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN SENTINEL,
Mar. 3, 1993, at 3D.
157. Fla. HB 1531, §§ 1, 2 (1993). These terms were defined by the bill as follows:
"Basic local exchange telecommunications service" means the telecommunications
service which provides a local dial tone, line, and local usage necessary to place or
receive a call within an exchange area and provides interconnection with an interex-
change service provider;
"Competitive service" means a telecommunications service that is offered by a local
exchange telecommunications company and one or more other providers;
"Cross-subsidization" means the providing of any service or benefit by a local ex-
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the legislation provided the FPSC with direction in defining which
markets are subject to the regulatory protections of sections 364.338
and 364.3381, Florida Statutes.'5 8
While -establishing a concrete definitional structure to implement
chapter 364, House Bill 1531 also expanded the authority of alterna-
tive access vendors by allowing them to offer private line services to
unaffiliated entities,5 9 which would have enabled AAVs to enjoy
many of the competitive benefits currently realized by CAPs in other
states. To facilitate competition, the bill also acknowledged the na-
tional policy of permitting competitors to interconnect with LEC net-
works to assist in providing competitive service offerings to
telecommunications consumers.'6 As a deterrent to anticompetitive
behavior, the bill provided penalties to any telecommunications pro-
vider that engaged in anticompetitive practices enumerated by the
Legislature or the Commission.' 6 1
change telecommunications company to its competitive business that it does not pro-
vide to other providers, under the same terms and conditions and shall also include the
pricing of a competitive or effectively competitive service offered by a local exchange
telecommunications company below its fully distributed cost.
"Effectively competitive service" means a telecommunications service offered by two
or more providers which compete under substantially similar terms and conditions;
"Monopoly service" means a telecommunications service for which there is no com-
petitive or effectively competitive alternative, either in fact or by operation of law.
158. Id. Sections 364.338 and 364.3381, Florida Statutes, set forth the protections from "an-
ticompetitive behavior" and "cross-subsidization" currently available under Florida law.
159. Fla. HB 1531, § 6 (1993).
160. Id. § 7. This form of interconnection is known as "collocation." For a scholarly discus-
sion of the LEC interpretation of this issue, see generally Larson & Mudd, supra note 4. This
concept has recently been adopted by the FCC. See In re Expanded Interconnection with Local
Telephone Company Facilities, No. 91-141 (Fed. Comm. Comm'n, October 19, 1992). Further-
more, since the defeat of HB 1531, the FPSC has scheduled hearings to investigate the possibili-
ties of collocation in Florida telecommunications networks. See In re Petition for expanded
interconnection for alternate access vendors within local exchange company central offices by
Intermedia Communications of Florida, Inc., Docket No. 921074-TP (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n).
Unfortunately for the telecommunications competitors and consumers of Florida, a final order
on Phase I of this matter is not anticipated until January 1994. Case and Scheduling Report, In
re Expanded Interconnection, No. 921074-TP (May 13, 1993).
161. See Fla. HB 1531, § 9 (1993). To clarify FPSC's purpose and role in facilitating a com-
petitive telecommunications marketplace, the bill would have amended section 364.338(1) to read
as follows:
Where the commission finds that a telecommunications service is competitive, the
commission shall ensure that the service is effectively competitive by assuring that
predatory pricing or other anticompetitive behavior is precluded, monopoly ratepayers
are protected from paying excessive rates and charges, and both ratepayers and com-
petitors are protected from monopoly telecommunications services subsidizing com-
petitive services.
Id. Further, the bill would have amended section 364.3381(11) to read that "no local exchange
telecommunications company shall make or give any undue preference or undue advantage to
the competitive telecommunications service of one provider versus another or to itself, including,
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To protect blossoming markets and preserve the equality between
telecommunications providers, the legislation also recognized emerg-
ing competitive services and mandated that the FPSC classify every
telecommunications service within the definitional parameters denoted
in the bill, that is, competitive, effectively competitive, or a monop-
oly. 16 By mandating this classification, the bill's sponsors sought to
avoid a repeat of the regulatory delay currently paralyzing the com-
petitive telecommunications markets.
By increasing the responsibilities of the FPSC and providing direc-
tion to solve the regulatory problems currently slowing the advance-
ment of competitive markets, House Bill 1531 would have provided an
effective catalyst for a regulatory framework that would have encour-
aged the development of blossoming competitive telecommunications
industries within the state."3 Despite addressing many of the regula-
tory questions left unanswered by the 1990 sunset revision to chapter
364 and the FPSC, House Bill 1531 was defeated.'6
Due to the enormous pressure of the LEC lobby 165 and the complex-
ities of the legislation, 66 House Bill 1531 died in committee, never
making it to the floor of the House of Representatives. 67 Although
amendments were offered in committee in an attempt to save the sub-
stantive issues, they also failed due to the enormous LEC opposition
and the time constraints of the remaining legislative session. Despite
but not limited to, billing collection, validation, physical collocation, and marketing services."
Id. § 10. This mandate would have placed new telecommunications providers on level ground to
compete with the established LEC monopolies and would have facilitated a more stable competi-
tive marketplace.
162. Id. § 11. This classification and a report by the FPSC justifying each classification was
to be completed by January 1, 1994 for review by the Legislature. Id.
163. Many statewide newspapers speculated that the passage of House Bill 1531 would have
promoted competition in emerging technological markets, thereby benefitting many Florida con-
sumers such as small businesses, banks, students, schools, and personal computer owners. See
generally Kennedy, supra note 156, at 3D.
164. See FLA. LEoIS., FNAL LEGISLATIVE BELt INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY
OF HouSE BILLS at 172, HB 1531.
165. In order to combat House Bill 1531, the LECs added extra professional lobbyists to its
lobbying team to portray the legislation as a threat to universal service and an attempt to circum-
vent the authority of the FPSC. Kennedy, supra note 156, at 3D.
166. The 1993 House Committee on Business and Professional Regulation included an un-
precedented nine new members who were unfamiliar with the complexities of the Florida tele-
communications marketplace. Despite five workshops on the issues of House Bill 1531, many of
these new members felt that the issues were too complicated to be handled in the 1993 session.
Steve Bousquet, Telephone Companies Kill Bill Favorable to Cable TV, MIAMI HERALD, March
3, 1993, at 3BR.
167. See FLA. LEoIS., FINAL LEOISATIVE Bat INFORMATION, 1993 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY
OF HousE BIS at 171, HB 1531. The actual committee vote on House Bill 1531 was 27-2 with
only Representative Frederick Lippman, Democrat, Hollywood, and Committee Chairman Jack
Tobin, Democrat, Margate, supporting the measure. See Kennedy, supra note 156, at 3D.
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the overwhelming defeat of House Bill 1531 before the House Com-
mittee on Business and Professional Regulation, the bill's Senate com-
panion was narrowly defeated as time ran out for debate with the bill
deadlocked in a 6-6 tie before the Senate Commerce Committee.18
Notwithstanding its defeat, House Bill 1531 opened the eyes of the
Legislature to the new technologies and services present in today's te-
lecommunications marketplace. Furthermore, the legislation an-
nounced the presence of emerging competitive providers whose voice
will most likely continue to be heard in the halls of the Legislature
until the LEC monopoly is sufficiently relaxed to permit fair competi-
tion. The bill's sponsors also succeeded in pointing out many of the
regulatory inefficiencies of the current system. The legislators' gradual
realization of these inefficiencies will likely lead to further legislative
attempts to update Florida's telecommunications regulatory structure.
Despite this promise for future reform, LEC-dominated telecom-
munications markets remain the status quo. With the failure of this
legislation, Florida now lags dramatically behind other states that are
pioneering the telecommunications industries of the future. Several
states are spurring revolutionary telecommunications competition by
implementing some of the ideas of House Bill 1531.
VI. HOUSE BILL 1531: IN USE THROUGHOUT THE NATION
While Florida continues to struggle with the regulatory advance-
ment of the telecommunications industry, several other states are pav-
ing the way to a competitive telecommunications marketplace with
regulatory mandates comparable to those contained in House Bill
1531. For example, many states have adopted detailed definitional
structures to assist regulators in clarifying the legislative intent behind
complex telecommunications laws. Legislators in some states have ex-
plicitly defined terms such as "basic local exchange service,'' 69 "com-
petitive service," 70 "informational service,'" 7 and "unregulated
168. See FLA. LEGIs., FINAL LEGISLATIVE BILL INFORMATION, 1993 REouLAR SESSION, HISTORY
OF SENATE BILLS at 166, SB 1638; see also Kennedy, supra note 156, at 3D.
169. See Mlcit. Comp. LAWS § 484.2102(b) (1993) ("'Basic local exchange service' means the
provision of an access line and usage within a local calling area for the transmission of high-
quality 2-way interactive switched voice or data communication."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-15-
102(3) (1992) ('Basic local exchange service' means the telecommunications service which pro-
vides a local dial tone line and local usage necessary to place or receive a call within an exchange
area.").
170. See MINN. STAT. § 237.57(2) (1992) ("'Competitive service' means a service that has
been determined to be subject to effective competition or emerging competition."). To further
clarify this definition for its regulatory commission, the Minnesota Legislature also added defini-
tions for "effective competition" and "emerging competition." Id. §§ 237.57(3),(4). For a serv-
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service"' 72 to give clear direction to their regulatory commissioners.
While praised in these states, Florida's Legislature rejected this form
of classification in the defeat of House Bill 1531.
Another aspect of House Bill 1531 that is in effect in other states is
a detailed framework of what constitutes anticompetitive behavior by
an LEC. Again, more-advanced regulatory states, such as Michigan,
have provided their regulatory commissioners with elaborate market
protections to facilitate the emergence of telecommunications compe-
tition and advanced telecommunications services,173 enabling Michigan
ice to be determined subject to "effective competition," alternative service must be available to
500o0 of the company's customers for that service. Id. § 237.59(5)(b). "Emerging competition,"
on the other hand, occurs when alternative service is available to 20076 of the customers for a
given service. Id. § 237.59(5)(c).
171. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-15-102(10) (1992) ('Informational service' means nonstan-
dard services provided to customers by means of personnel and facilities which include personal-
ized intercept, synthesized voice messages, specialized bill services, and personalized number
services.").
172. Michigan and Colorado have promulgated detailed lists of those services that are not
regulated in their respective states, including enhanced services, paging, cellular, mobile and an-
swering services, video, cable television, pay-per-view, shared tenant, private networks, financial
services, networks, radio and television, WATS, personal communications networks, munici-
pally owned telecommunication systems, 800 prefix services, and the reselling of a telecommuni-
cation service, centron and centron-like services, special access, and new products and services
other than those necessary to provide basic local exchange service. See MICH. COMP. LAWS §
484.2401(1) (1993); COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-15-401(1) (1992).
173. For example, the Michigan Legislature has ordered that a basic local exchange service
provider shall not do any of the following:
(a) Discriminate against another provider by refusing or delaying access to the local
exchange.
(b) Refuse or delay interconnections or provide inferior connections to another pro-
vider.
(c) Degrade the quality of access provided to another provider.
(d) Impair the speed, quality, or efficiency of lines used by another provider.
(e) Develop new services to take advantage of planned but not publicly known changes
in the underlying network.
(f) Refuse or delay a request of another provider for information regarding the techni-
cal design, equipment capabilities and features, geographic coverage, and traffic pat-
terns of the local exchange network.
(g) Refuse or delay access or be unreasonable in connecting another provider to the
local exchange whose product or service requires novel or specialized access require-
ments.
(h) Upon a request, fail to fully disclose in a timely manner all available information
necessary for the design of equipment that will meet the specifications of the local
exchange network.
(i) Discriminate against any provider or any party who requests the information for
commercial purposes in the dissemination of customer proprietary information. A
provider shall provide without unreasonable discrimination or delay telephone direc-
tory listing information and related services to persons purchasing telephone directory
listing information to the same extent and in the same quality as provided to the pro-
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regulators to concentrate on other regulatory concerns. Classifying
anticompetitive behavior this way could have saved the FPSC and its
staff nearly three years of effort expended in the cross-subsidization
docket 7 4 and would have likely prevented a pending lawsuit involving
Southern Bell and Peoples Telephone Company."
Some states require that their regulatory commissions not only clas-
sify each service, but also file annual reports detailing the status of the
telecommunications marketplace .176 In California and Michigan, the
public regulatory commissions must report to their respective state
legislatures on substantive telecommunications issues, such as the im-
pact of deregulation, the changes in the telecommunications market-
place, the emergence of competitive telecommunications markets, the
status of market-share concentration, and the availability of alterna-
tive services. 77 These reports help educate legislators on telecommuni-
cations issues and advise them on necessary regulatory changes.
In Florida, the FPSC is required to prepare a biennial report "on
competition in the telecommunications industry" and "a detailed ex-
position of any and all alternative regulatory treatments" imple-
mented or planned during the preceding two years.178 While these
reports present an overview of some aspects of Florida's telecommuni-
vider, affiliates of the provider, or any other listing information purchaser.
(j) Refuse or delay access by any person to another provider.
(k) Sell, lease, or otherwise transfer an asset to an affiliate for an amount less than the
fair market value of the asset.
(1) Buy, lease, or otherwise acquire an asset from an affiliate of the provider for an
amount greater than the fair market value of the asset.
(in) Bundle unwanted services or products for sale or lease to another provider.
(n) Perform any act that has been prohibited by this act or an order of the commis-
sion.
(o) Except with the approval of the commission, jointly market or offer as a package,
at a discounted rate, 1 or more unregulated services with a regulated service.
(p) Sell services or products, extend credit, or offer other terms and conditions on
more favorable terms to an affiliate of the provider than the provider offers to other
providers.
MICH. Comp. LAWS § 484.2305(1) (1993).
174. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
175. See Peoples Tel. Co. v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., No. 93-1260 (S.D. Fla.,
filed July 1, 1993).
176. See CAL. PUB. UTn., CODE § 495.5 (West 1991); MtcH. CoMP. LAWS § 484.2202(f)
(1993).
177. See CAL. PuB. UTL. CODE § 495.5 (West 1991); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 484.2202(f)
(1993).
178. FLA. STAr. § 364.386(1) (1991). In addition to this report filed by the FPSC, the Office
of Public Counsel, the public's representative before the Commission, is also directed by statute
to submit a report on competition in the telecommunications industry and how alternative regu-
latory methods have benefitted the ratepayers and consumers in Florida. FLA. STAT. § 364.386(2)
(1991).
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cations marketplace, they do not offer the complete outlook presented
by other state regulatory commissions in guiding their legislators in
evaluating complex telecommunications issues. Such detailed reports,
like those prepared in Michigan and California, could have given the
Florida legislators an in-depth, independent opinion to assist them in
their evaluation of House Bill 1531 and its substantive issues. 7 9
In addition to providing definitive direction to their regulatory com-
missions comparable to those proposed in House Bill 1531, the more
advanced states also grant regulators the freedom to assist in the
development of advanced, competitive telecommunications services.
Some states, such as Michigan, allow their commissioners to fully re-
lax telecommunications regulations for experimental projects deemed
to be in the public interest.18 0 Such offerings, while generally on a six-
month or one-year trial basis, assist companies and regulators in trou-
ble-shooting new services without impacting universal service.
New York is paving the way in advanced telecommunications serv-
ices and competition. The New York Public Service Commission
(NYPSC) has earned the reputation of being the leading regulatory
advocate of increased local telecommunications competition.', With-
out broad legislative directives, the NYPSC has opened the doors to
competition in all areas of telecommunications. The most pronounced
area of competitive advancement, however, is in competitive access.
Since the mid-1980s, the NYPSC has initiated broad regulatory pol-
icies that have pioneered competitive access deregulation. New York
became the first state in the nation to authorize the provision of in-
traexchange services by a CAP, 8 2 the first to adopt a generic policy
regarding "bypass" of the LEC network,8 3 the first to require an
LEC to collocate with the networks of its local competitor, '4 and the
179. With regard to HB 1531, the newest legislators did not have the advantage of a 1993
report prepared by the FPSC because the reports are required to be submitted by the FPSC and
Office of Public Counsel on January 1 of even numbered years. FLA. STAT. § 364.386(1) (1991).
Between the 1992 report and the 1993 legislative session, the competitive telecommunications
marketplace changed dramatically as LEC competitors such as AAVs more than quadrupled in
the State of Florida. See generally FLA. PuB. SERV. Comm'N, supra note 72, at 1-4.
180. See, e.g., MIcH. Cor,. LAWS § 484.2301(4) (1993).
181. See Schwartz & Hoagg, supra note 4, at 319-24.
182. Jean L. Kiddoo & Jonathan E. Canis, Developments in the Local Exchange Market,
352 PsAc. L. INST./PAT., COPYRIGHTS, TRAmARexs, & LITERARY PROP. 393 (PLI Order No.
G4-3894, Dec. 3-4, 1992).
183. Telephone Services that Bypass Local Exchange or Toll Networks, Case No. 28710,
Opinion and Order Concerning Bypass, Opinion No. 85-16, 70 PUR 4th 1 (N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, Oct. 3, 1985).
184. Kiddoo & Canis, supra note 182 (citing Opinion and Order on Pooling, Collocation and
Access Rate Design, Case No. 28425, Opinion No. 92-13 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, May 29,
1992), modified on rehearing, Opinion and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Peti-
tions for Rehearing or Clarification, Opinion No. 92-13(A) (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Sept. 4,
1992)).
1993]
698 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:663
first to consider restructuring switched access transport pricing to cre-
ate competition in that market.' 5 Some of these thriving competitive
policies, such as collocation, were incorporated in House Bill 1531.186
Despite the proven successes of the New York regulatory structure,
the Florida Legislature has chosen to continue the status quo of LEC-
dominated, intrastate telecommunications.
House Bill 1531 was, in part, a culmination of the regulatory suc-
cesses of New York and other states. Borrowing from the experiences
of other states, this legislation could have vaulted Florida to the cut-
ting edge of telecommunications regulation. In defeating this legisla-
tion, however, Florida has signaled that it will approach competition
in the telecommunications industry with a more cautious tenor than
its sister states. In order to protect the emerging telecommunications
markets in Florida, this caution should also be tempered with the wis-
dom of insightful observation of the successes of other states.
VII. CoNcLusioN
The defeat of House Bill 1531 resulted in preservation of the status
quo in the Florida telecommunications markets. The efforts of Repre-
sentatives Lippman and others did, however, open the eyes of the
Legislature to current shortcomings of the system. House Bill 1531
pointed out the current regulatory restraint placed on the AAVs' abili-
ties to connect unaffiliated entities. The bill also called attention to
the limited regulatory freedom given to the FPSC to authorize experi-
mental services and revolutionary forms of competition in areas such
as switched local access service. By revealing such shortfalls in the
present system and highlighting the current trends in other states, the
Florida Legislature appears to be poised to revisit some of these issues
and to reorganize the regulatory structure to grant the FPSC greater
regulatory freedom to expand the competitive telecommunications
markets in Florida.
While the FPSC has been slow to implement the mandates of the
1990 sunset review, House Bill 1531 appears to have spurred the Com-
mission and its staff into reevaluating the competitive nature of Flori-
da's local telecommunications markets. 8 7 Current pending dockets
185. Id.
186. See, e.g., HB 1531 § 7 (1993) (allowing telecommunications providers to collocate).
187. Since the initial proposal of House Bill 1531, the FPSC and its staff have taken a more
liberal approach toward telecommunications regulation. The FPSC and its staff are now consid-
ering dockets on the presence of competitive services and the possibility of allowing competitors
to collocate with LEC networks, all of which were offered as part of House Bill 1531. See In re
Investigation into which LEC services are effectively competitive, Docket No. 930046-TP (Fla.
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appear to offer more opportunities for the FPSC to take steps toward
the promises of the "Information Age." While only time will tell the
impact of House Bill 1531 on Florida's telecommunications regula-
tion, it appears that Florida is now slowly progressing toward the
twenty-first century.
Pub. Serv. Comm'n); In re Petition for expanded interconnection for AAVs within LEC central
offices, Docket No. 921074-TP (Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n). While these dockets will not be fully
resolved until late 1994 or 1995, it appears that House Bill 1531 has spurred some regulatory
action.

